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I.

INTRODUCTION

To cope with rising health insurance premiums of the last
decade, employers, local and national business coalitions, and
private insurance carriers have undertaken serious efforts to
more effectively manage the costs of providing health care coverage for their employees. A principle component of such cost
management strategies is hospital utilization review (UR).
UR is a process undertaken by employers and insurers to
monitor effective use of health care by requiring third-party
evaluation of the need for medical treatment. The underlying
belief of UR is that health care costs can be controlled, in part,
by decreasing or eliminating unnecessary care.' Although a
precise definition of unnecessary care is elusive,2 such care
generally includes those services that are in excess of the
needs of the patient.
Some studies have shown that unnecessary care occurs frequently and absorbs excessive funds.3 In identifying the
* Ms. Oehm is the lead consultant in the audit and design of third party utilization
management systems for the Medical Audit Services/National Medical Audit Division
(MAS/NMA) of William M. Mercer, Incorporated.
1. "Medically unnecessary" services are those services (including admission to or
continued stay in a hospital) which are in excess of the basic needs of a particular
patient at a particular time. Historically, many private insurance plans have broadly
defined "medically necessary" services as those services ordered by a physician to treat
an illness or injury. Under the Professional Standards Review Organization Program
(PSRO-Pub. L. 92-603), this definition was expanded to define medically unnecessary
as care which did not meet "professionally recognized standards of care," or which
could have been provided in a nursing home or on an outpatient basis. Because there
was no definition of "professionally recognized standards of care," in conjunction with
the funding of the PSRO program, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
contracted with the American Medical Association (AMA) in 1974 to develop sample
standards which PSROs could apply as screening criteria. Working with 38 major
national medical specialty societies, the AMA issued model screening criteria in May,
1975 and revised sample screening criteria in 1976.
2. See discussion infra notes 62-74.
3. A variety of studies have shown that between 10 and 20 percent of hospital
admissions and 20-30 percent of hospital days are inappropriate or unnecessary. See,
e.g., Milstein, Oehmn & Alpert, Utilization Review Performance: Skepticism About
Some Review ProgramsSpawns Use of Medical Audits, Bus. AND HEALTH, Feb., 1987,
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sources of unnecessary care so as to prevent excessive spending, UR studies have targeted hospital use.4 Hospital use has
been the most closely studied aspect of the health care system
mainly because hospitals provide the highest cost services5 and
hospitals are fewer in number than physicians or other health
care providers.6 Therefore, while there are some UR programs
that focus on managing the use of outpatient services, UR has
typically focused on controlling the unnecessary use of
hospitals.7
Today, UR is the most widely used approach in controlling
or eliminating overuse of hospital services. According to a 1990
survey of 776 of the largest employers in the United States, 74
percent use UR as part of a health care cost management strategy.' A similar survey in 1985 showed only 47 percent had
implemented UR.9 According to the Health Insurance Association of America, about half of all United States businesses use
some form of UR. 10
Employers (large and small) are the primary purchasers of
private UR services. They purchase services from firms which
only offer UR services or from insurers which offer either
their own UR services or contract for UR services from freestanding vendors. Most national insurance carriers offer UR
services in conjunction with claims administration services.
UR services are integrated into a variety of health plan
designs, including indemnity plans, preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and health maintenance organizations
at 10; Restuccia & Gertman, A ComparativeAnalysis of Appropriatenessof Hospital
Use, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Summer 1984, at 130; Siu & Sonnenberg, InappropriateUse of
Hospitals in a Randomized Trial of Health Insurance Plans, 315 NEW ENG. J. OF MED.
1259 (1986).
4. See supra note 3.
5. The highest cost services include intensive care, premature infant care, and
significant surgeries such as coronary artery bypass graft.
6. Provider is used in this Article as a generic term which includes any person or
institution which gives medical services. Providers typically are physicians and
hospitals.
7. Programs focused on outpatient services are less common and well-developed
and will not be addressed in this paper. Some UR firms perform review of selected
outpatient procedures, and some national carriers evaluate patterns of care through
their claims data systems. Ambulatory utilization review efforts are primarily
associated with Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).
8. W. Mercer, Inc., Survey on Employer Attitudes Toward the Cost of Health Care
(1990) (copy on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
9. Id.
10. See Marcinko & Foster, Mixed Reviews-More Scrutiny for UR, MHCI & T 14
(Fall 1990).
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(HMOs)."
Despite the tremendous increases in health care costs and
the resulting growth of UR, there is disagreement about the
effectiveness of UR in controlling health care costs. There are
two general views on the value and effectiveness of private UR
programs. The first view is that UR is a positive factor in the
health care system, but it has some problems which can be
resolved to improve the process. The second view is that,
while theoretically UR is positive, its implementation is an
unnecessary administrative burden on the health care system
and an intrusion into the practice of medicine. The view taken
largely depends on the specific types of programs one has
experienced, and, because programs vary widely, both views
are valid.
This Article describes the history of private UR and provides illustrations of successes, problems and controversies.
The Article concludes with some suggestions and prescriptive
advice for those who are likely to encounter UR, either
through work with particular clients or directly as part of a
private benefit plan.
II.

BACKGROUND ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

UR

Historically, in both the public and private sectors, third
party payors (e.g., the government and employer-sponsored
insurance plans) paid providers on a percentage of charges or
fee-for-service basis. As long as services were "covered," 12 the
third party would pay, and the third party payor required little
information from the provider beyond a diagnosis and the total
charges. In typical employer plans, insurance covered 80 or 90
percent of charges and the employee paid the remainder sub11. There are three major generic types of health plan designs. All three have
many different variations in practice. In indemnity plans, insured persons have free
choice of physician and hospital, and the insurance carrier pays the provider directly.
The amount of payment (e.g., 80 percent) and any deductibles are administered by the
insurance carrier. In a preferred provider organization, an insurance carrier or
employer contracts with a network of specific hospitals and physicians. Employees
choosing a provider from this network receive a higher benefit. The network
providers may be paid on a fee-for-service or per member per month (capitation) basis.
In a health maintenance organization, specific physician and hospitals are paid on a
capitation basis, and employees are offered incentives such as lower monthly health
care payments, no deductibles, etc., for participation.
12. Covered services are generally defined in the basic health plan. Most plans,
for example, exclude cosmetic and experimental treatments from coverage. Most
plans cover services which are medically necessary for the treatment of illness or
injury. Most plans also provide that services must be ordered by a physician.
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ject to deductibles and annual out-of-pocket expense limits.
Providers, primarily physicians, controlled both the volume
and price of services rendered. Third party payor questions
were generally limited to coverage issues, deductibles, and preexisting conditions.
A.

Public Sector Utilization Review

The earliest attempts to control escalating health care
costs in the 1970s began in the public sector, and specifically in
the Medicare program. With Medicare, the responsibility for
performing UR was vested with hospitals and insurance carriers participating in the Medicare program. 1 3 Such efforts
largely failed to control costs because the hospitals and physicians had no real incentive to provide fewer services.' 4 Further, the insurance carriers monitored the hospital
performance at infrequent intervals.
Drawing largely on the experience of medical care foundations, in 1972, the Professional Standards Review Program
(PSRO) was implemented.'" PSROs were federally-funded
private, non-profit corporations formed by state and local
groups of practicing physicians following requirements laid out
by law. PSROs were charged with assuring that the services
provided under the Medicaid, Medicare, and Maternal and
Child Health Programs were medically necessary, met professionally recognized standards of care, and were provided in the
16
most appropriate setting.
13. HEALTH STANDARDS & QUALITY BUREAU, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REVIEW ORGANIZATION: PROVISIONS OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS (September 1972) (Senate Finance Committee

Report 92-1230).
14. Id. Arguably, in fact, hospitals and physicians had incentive to increase the
amount of services provided to maximize their own revenues. Early private sector

efforts showed greater promise for controlling costs than the previous public efforts.
Medical care foundations developed various techniques, including review of planned
hospital admissions in advance, which seemed to show more promise than traditional

internal hospital review. Medical Care foundations are privately organized groups of
physicians who perform UR and claims administration services. See also DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF
PROGRAM POLICY AND PLANNING, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, AN
EVALUATION OF A MEDICARE CONCURRENT UTILIZATION REVIEW PROJECT: THE
SACRAMENTO CERTIFIED HOSPITAL ADMISSION PROGRAM, HEALTH INSURANCE
STATISTICS, (March 17, 1978).

15. Id.
16. YALE UNIVERSITY STUDY GROUP, PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
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PSROs were fully implemented in most states by the end
of the 1970s. 1' Despite some successes,'" variations in local
PSRO performance, continued increases in public sector costs,
and the development of new Medicare payment policies, led to
the replacement of the PSRO program with the current Peer
Review Organization (PRO) program. The PRO program is
designed to monitor quality and costs under Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS). 9
In contrast to PRO review, PSRO review programs were
applied prior to or concurrently with the delivery of services.
Under the Medicare PPS, PRO review is designed to be
applied primarily after services are delivered and after payment has been made. With the change in the public sector
focus of review (from prospective to retrospective), employers
found PROs somewhat less attractive. This conflict in review
approach coupled with the increasing private demand for UR
led to the development of the many private review programs
which exist today.
B. Development of Private Utilization Review
As public UR spread, and controls were tightened on public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, providers shifted
more costs to private insurance plans which were largely
uncontrolled. As a result, by the late 1980s, when the national
health care bill was almost 12 percent of the Gross National
Product,20 the private sector was financing nearly 60 percent of
COMMERCE,

BACKGROUND

REPORT

ON

PROFESSIONAL

STANDARDS

REVIEW

ORGANIZATIONS. H.R. Doc. 3, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
17. In fact, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, employers began to look to PSROs
to provide services in the private sector. Rulifson, Deere and Company Battle Costs
Through Peer Review, 1 THE INTERNIST, 25, January, 1984, at 25.
18. See Adler & Milstein, Evaluating the Impact of Physician Peer Review:
FactorsAssociated with Successful PSROs, 73 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, 1182 (1983).
19. The Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) replaced the previous costbased hospital reimbursement with the development of an estimated cost per case.
Using historical Medicare cost data from hundreds of hospitals, complex computer
algorithms which categorize cases into different diagnosis-related groupings (DRGs)
were developed. In general, regardless of the length of stay, the hospital would be paid
the same rate for a particular type of case. Very high-cost or long-stay cases can
qualify for additional reimbursement. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
Hospital Prospective Payment for Medicare: Report to Congress 7-18 (Dec. 1982)
(reprinted in MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH), Ed. 374 (Jan. 5, 1983).
20. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
ADMINISTRATION,

(1990).

MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET: STATISTICAL

HIGHLIGHTS
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these enormous health care expenditures.2 1
This cost shifting from public to private payers intensified
the pressure on employers. Although consistent national data
are not readily available, a few employers have published
reports on their specific increasing health care costs. Two companies which have published such reports are Deere and Company and Chrysler Corporation.2 2 Between 1972 and 1977, the
direct costs of providing health care benefits to Deere and
Company's 200,000 employees, dependents, and retirees rose
300 percent, from $20 million to $60 million annually.23
By
1983, health care expenditures accounted for 11 percent of
Deere and Company's total direct labor costs for production. 4
Similarly, in 1988, Chrysler reported a 14 percent increase in
health care costs, more than triple the consumer price index.25
Because of rapidly rising health care costs, health benefit
plans have become very valuable in attracting employees and
in negotiating collective bargaining agreements. As such,
employers faced with rising health care costs began to look for
ways to reduce costs without cutting back overall benefit
levels. One way to achieve these apparently contradictory
goals appeared to be by eliminating unnecessary hospital use.
Estimates of unnecessary hospital use indicate that
between 10 and 20 percent of hospital admissions and between
20 to 30 percent of hospital days are not medically necessary.26
Independent evaluations performed on behalf of individual
employers revealed that between 10 and 47 percent of all hospital days were not medically necessary.2 Thus, elimination of
unnecessary hospital use has the potential of reducing overall
benefit plan costs without requiring the employer to make
major alterations in the overall benefit plan design or delivery
system.28
21. Medical Benefits, THE MED. ECONOMIC DIGEST, Oct. 15, 1987, at 1.
22. See infra notes 23-25.
23. Rulifson, Deere & Company Battles Costs Through Peer Review, THE
INTERNIST, Jan. 1984.

24. Id.
25. Califano, Billions Blown on Health, N.Y. Times, April 12, 1989, at A25, col. 3.
26. Restuccia & Getman, supra note 3, at 130, 132, 134.
27. Milstein, Oehm & Alpert, supra note 3, at 10.

28. Controlling unnecessary use is the principal focus of UR, but it is only one
element in many companies' cost containment strategies. . Increased deductibles and
co-payments, revised benefit limits, point of service plans, and alternative delivery

systems such as preferred provider organizations and
organizations are frequently used in conjunction with UR.

health
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Some private sector efforts have been quite successful.
One comprehensive study found that private UR reduced hospital admissions by 13 percent, total days by 11 percent, and
total medical expenditures by 6 percent.' Additionally, high
yield comprehensive medical cost containment programs have
resulted in 15 to 30 percent savings in medical costs.30 Such
programs have substantial promise for achieving the elusive
goals of controlling health care costs without compromising
the quality of care provided to patients.
III.

THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE UTILIZATION REVIEW

With the increasing demand for UR services, the number
of firms has grown and, although there is no complete directory, there are more than 200 firms operating today.3 ' While
these UR firms share generic goals and processes, actual implementation of UR programs varies.
The most typical private UR programs are telephonebased. In these programs, providers or employees (patients)
call a toll-free telephone number to notify the UR firm of
expected treatment.3 2 Some plans have employee penalties
(e.g. an increased co-payment or flat fee) for failure to notify
the review system. In nearly all programs, the penalty is
waived if the patient attempted but was unable to notify the
review system. In other programs, notification is voluntary.
Once the call is made, one or more specific review
processes is applied. The review of hospital services generally
occurs in three stages: prior to admission (preadmission
review) for scheduled surgeries; at or immediately after admission for emergency admissions (admission or concurrent
review); and during a hospital stay (continued stay or concurrent review). 33 As part of or as an add-on to these three basic
services, most UR firms offer surgical necessity screening
(often associated with second opinions), discharge planning,
29. Wickizer, Wheeler, & Feldstein, Does Utilization Review Reduce Unnecessary
Hospital Care and Contain Costs?, 27 MED. CARE, 32, June 1989.
30. Milstein, Controlling Workers' Compensation Costs "CaliforniaStyle", RISK
MANAGEMENT, September, 1988.

31. Id. UR firms compete heavily for lucrative private accounts which generate
charges of $20 to $36 per covered employee per year.
32. For most employers, basic UR requirements and relevant toll-free numbers
are contained on the employee insurance identification cards.
33. Each specific UR service is designed to control a different aspect of hospital
use. Most UR firms use the same labels to market their services.
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and high cost case management. Some firms offer review services after discharge.'
A.

PreadmissionReview

Preadmission Review applies to planned admissions, usually surgeries. Its goal is to assure that a particular patient is
not hospitalized for a specific procedure that could be performed outside the hospital for a lower cost and at a lower risk
to the patient. All UR firms look at the appropriateness of site
of care during the preadmission review process. Once the hospital is approved as the most appropriate site of care, many
firms will establish a projected length of stay and will include
an assessment of the need for any in-hospital days prior to surgery (pre-operative nights).
Most UR firms will discuss these recommendations with
the attending physician and rely on the physician to communicate with the patient. However, it is not clear how regularly
and clearly physicians discuss outpatient options or length of
stay with patients. To the extent attending physicians (or a
UR firm) talk to patients about length of stay, patients can be
influenced to more willingly forego the pre-operative night and
accept an ambulatory surgery or a much shorter hospital
stay.'
Instead of relying solely on physicians informing
patients, a few UR firms actively seek to discuss coverage
options and general length of stay information with patients.
Those firms that do discuss coverage options tend to have better patient response and greater savings than those that do not.
Another feature of the preadmission review process is
determining the necessity of a surgical procedure. In some UR
programs this review is automatic; in others, surgical necessity
review is a separate program requiring separate telephone
calls.
34. Review services provided after discharge are not within the typical scope of
service routinely offered by UR firms. Another nontypical UR service that some firms
offer is a hospital bill audit service. In bill audit programs, the UR firm obtains a copy
of the hospital medical record and compares the individual services rendered with the
billed services. Frequently, bill audits are applied only to cases in which prospective or
concurrent review was not applied. Because bill audits and retrospective review
services are not typical private review services, they are not addressed in detail in this
Article.
35. Preadmission review is also known as pre-certification, prior authorization,
preadmission certification, and pre-determination.
36. See Hall, Short Surgical Stay: Two Hospital Days for Cholecystectomy, 154
THE AM. J. Of SURGERY, at 510 (Nov. 1987).
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Programs reviewing the need for surgery vary widely.
Some employers have lists of operative procedures which
require a second opinion prior to approval of the procedure. If
the patient does not obtain a second opinion, the patient cannot
receive maximum benefit coverage. High cost or frequentlyperformed elective procedures are normally on these lists.
In other plans, a wide variety of therapeutic and diagnostic
procedures are screened by the UR program to determine the
need for surgery. 7 These programs may require substantial
clinical information, may engage in detailed interviews with
patients, and may apply relatively sophisticated computer algorithms before requiring a second opinion.
The original goal of second-opinion programs was to
reduce unnecessary surgery and thereby reduce health care
costs. The most effective programs are those that use a
selected panel of second-opinion consultants, do thorough
patient histories, and consult the physicians. In addition, these
second-opinion programs provide a means of educating the
patient about the benefits and risks of surgery.'
B. Admission Review3 9
Admission review applies to urgent or emergency admissions which are essentially unplanned. The goals at this stage
are to verify the medical necessity for admission and assign an
initial length of stay, usually within 24 to 72 hours following
37. See supra note 1.
38. The longest running second-opinion program in the United States is the
Cornell-New York Hospital program. Findings from this program showed that 18
percent of those required to seek a second opinion were not confirmed for surgery. See
MCCARTHY, SECOND OPINION ELECTIvE SURGERY at 155 (1981). The reported successes

from this program resulted in replication of programs around the country.
Unfortunately, the replications have had less success than the Cornell program.
At least one key to Cornell's success is the use of a selected panel of secondopinion consultants. Many UR firms do not use panel physicians, relying instead on
the attending physician or the telephone book yellow pages to identify a secondopinion consultant. Because this unfortunately common approach to second opinions
resulted in virtually no non-confirmations, many UR firms incorporated various
second-opinion waivers into their programs.
These waiver programs coupled with good clinical screening and use of a selected
panel of second-opinion consultants can provide patients with information needed to
make informed decisions about surgery. The best programs take a good history from
the patient as well as talking to the physician. The interview process itself can raise
issues for the patient to consider, such as menopausal symptoms and problems a young
patient might expect after a hysterectomy.
39. Admission Review is also known as concurrent admission review, emergency
admission certification, or with continued stay review as concurrent review.
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hospital admission. Some programs verify the actual urgent or
emergent nature of admission to determine if the case should
have been subject to preadmission review. If preadmission
review was in order, a late notification penalty may be applied.
Finally, the admitting offices of most hospitals understand
third party review and, thus, hospital admitting office personnel will often notify UR firms of urgent and emergency
admissions.
C. Continued Stay Review 41
The goal of Continued Stay Review is to assure the patient
is hospitalized only as long as necessary. To accomplish this,
following a preadmission or admission review, most UR firms
will contact the hospital and/or physician at specific checkpoints during a hospital stay.
D. Discharge Planning
The goal Discharge Planning is to actively facilitate discharge by identifying and arranging any needed alternatives to
hospital care which could shorten the length of stay. Although
most firms "advertise" this service, in many cases the planning
function consists of a referral to a hospital social service or discharge planning department. Some UR firms actively assist
patients and physicians with short term arrangements (e.g.
home care, durable medical equipment) to facilitate early
discharge.
E.

Case Management

An increasing number of UR firms are offering specialized
management services for patients with various high-cost
problems of a catastrophic or chronic nature. These patients
include individuals with AIDS, spinal cord or brain injuries,
stroke, and premature infants.
In typical programs, UR firms employ case managers, usually nurses, many with specialized experience and expertise in
the clinical management of high-cost cases.4 The goal of highcost case management is essentially to coordinate and organize
40. Continued Stay Review is also known as length of stay review and concurrent
review.
41. Using diagnosis-specific and length of stay screens or by direct referral from
general review staff, case managers evaluate each case for potential management based
on an overall assessment of the patient's medical and social requirements. In many
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health care resources to most efficiently address the medical
and psychosocial needs of patients and families. 42 For such
high-cost cases, the UR firm may authorize benefits for services which are not normally covered or may help extend the
use of lifetime benefits by developing unique plans such as
modifying a patient's home to accommodate a wheelchair.
In most firms, each stage of review is carried out by nurses
making calls to hospitals or physician's offices to collect
clinical data. After clinical data are obtained, nurses screen
the need for hospital care using screening criteria adopted or
established by the firm.43 Cases failing to meet the criteria
parameters are generally referred to a physician for evaluation. These physician evaluations may result in a contact with
the patient's treating physician.
Some plans have penalties which are imposed on patients
or hospitals for failure to follow the UR recommendations. In
some plans, there is no coverage after a negative UR determination. In others, there may be a benefit reduction (e.g. 70 percent coverage instead of 90 percent). All programs have appeal
provisions for persons dissatisfied with a review decision.
Overall, there is some degree of uniformity between UR
programs. Nonetheless, there are substantial differences as
well. Because private UR is regulated in only a few states, and,
until late in 1990, there were no voluntary guidelines, there is
little consistency in UR program implementation.

IV. FORMAL SOLUTIONS TO UTILIZATION REVIEW PROBLEMS
Because the number of UR firms has markedly increased
over the last 5 years, there are more UR firms requesting more
information concerning the care of patients. As a result, physicians' offices and hospitals are becoming increasingly resistant
to the volume of requests and vastly different information
requirements of various UR programs. The resistance and concases, UR firms will perform or arrange a visit with the patient to directly assess care
needs.

42. Henderson & Souder, PrivateSector Initiatives in Case Management,HEALTH
CARE IqNANCING REV., 89, (1988 Ann. Supp.).

43. Two criteria sets have the most widespread use in the United States today.
The first is the ISD Review System criteria, revised to become the ISD-A Review
System criteria published by InterQual. The second criteria set is the Appropriateness
Evaluation Protocol (AEP), developed by Paul Gertman and Joseph Restuccia. Many
UR firms have developed their own criteria, incorporating decision-tree logic into
computerized programs which nurses can apply.
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cerns of providers and employees have been formally and
informally transmitted to various national health organizations
and to federal and state governments.
In response to these increasing concerns, the National
Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine (IOM) formed a
committee to study third party payers' utilization strategies in
1987 and 1988. 44 The committee was charged with providing
an overall picture of private UR, an analysis of the effects on
various participants in the process, a framework for questions
raised by UR in its current applications, and recommendations
for future action. The IOM report concluded that, while
national regulation of the UR industry was not warranted at
the time, greater accountability on the part of UR firms was
needed.4 5 Specifically, the committee recommended that UR
firms provide (and purchasers demand and provide to employees) information in the following areas: 1) Source of screening
criteria; 2) Availability criteria to providers; 3) Source of physician reviewers; 4) Qualifications of nurse reviewers; 5)
Appeals/grievance mechanisms. 46
In response to the IOM recommendations, five national
healthcare trade associations the American Hospital Association (AHA), the American Medical Association (AMA), the
Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), Blue Cross
and Blue Shield Association (BCA) and the American Managed Care Review Association (AMCRA),4 7 issued voluntary
guidelines in September 1990 to promote the consistency and
uniformity of UR procedures.48
At the same time, the
AMCRA formed the Utilization Review Accreditation Com44. Inst. of Med., Minutes of the Comm. to Study Utilization Management by

Third Parties (Dec. 19-20, 1988) (copy on file with the University of Puget Sound Law
Review). [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
45. Id.

46. Id.
47. AMCRA is the trade association supported and paid for by UR firms. AHA is
the national trade association for hospitals; AMA is the national trade association for
physicians; HIAA is the national trade association for private insurance companies;
BCA is the national trade association for Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans. These
trade associations have no authority over members. Compliance with professional
standards as defined by the organization is voluntary. The trade associations came
together largely because of concerns raised by their respective members about private
UR and the wide variability of UR implementation.
48. AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION,

HOSPITAL

AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION,

BLUE

MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

CROSS

AMERICAN

AND

BLUE

MANAGED

SHIELD

CARE

AND

REVIEW ASSOCIATION, HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, GUIDELINES FOR
HEALTH BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION (Sept. 1990).
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mission (URAC). 4 9 URAC is a separate, free-standing organization created to form common national standards and a
voluntary accreditation process for UR organizations.
The voluntary guidelines issued by the five national
healthcare organizations are intended to form the basis for
URAC's work in establishing accreditation standards and, in
part, are based on the IOM's recommendations. 50 As of now,
no formal accreditation surveys have been completed. However, most UR firms are apparently aware of the voluntary
guidelines and indicate they plan to follow them.
The voluntary guidelines address the following areas:
1. Physician involvement and access to physician reviewers. The guidelines specifically recommend physician involvement in establishing medical protocols, review processes, and
physician reviewer availability to discuss medical rationales for
review decisions.
2. Medical criteria. Professionally accepted criteria
should be used for review, and criteria should be updated regularly. Review organizations should inform physicians and hospitals, upon request, about their program requirements and the
general type of criteria used.
3. Frequency of concurrentreview and provider contacts.
The guidelines recommend focused reviews, discourage daily
reviews on all patients, and encourage notification of the provider if medical treatment is not supported.
4. General contact procedures. Review organizations
should make available general contact procedures for questions
and specific appeals procedures.
5. Patient confidentiality. Review organizations should
49. URAC was incorporated in 1990 in the District of Columbia as a non-profit
organization. Articles of incorporation and bylaws were adopted and an interim board
and four standing committees were established. URAC was formed by AMCRA and is
intended to be a voluntary accreditation body. At this writing, no accreditation
surveys have yet been undertaken.
AMCRA has provided the financial and staff support for URAC's first year.
Support in subsequent years is intended to come from payments from organizations
who pay for voluntary accreditation surveys. Memo from Roger Taylor, M.D.,
President, Utilization Review Accreditation Commission to Utilization Review
Organizations (Sept. 27, 1990) (copy on file with the University of Puget Sound Law
Review).
50. The IOM study was federally funded by the National Academy of Sciences in
Washington D.C., and the committee was comprised of invited "volunteers" who are
experienced in UR or related fields. The report was issued for information only; IOM
has no authority over any UR firm.
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have procedures in place to protect patient confidentiality. 5 '
In addition to recommendations concerning the actual conduct of review, the guidelines include recommendations concerning administrative procedures. These administrative
procedures encourage UR firms to be sensitive to operational
demands on hospital and physician time, recommending that
firms accept call-backs, collect only the information required
to make a review decision, and attempt to consolidate calls to
the same providers.52 Likewise, the guidelines also encourage
hospitals and physicians to cooperate with UR efforts. They
recommend that employees be fully informed of plan requirements governing UR and that information release forms be
available to permit the exchange of information with UR
firms.

s

For at least seven states these voluntary efforts have come
too late. Largely in response to pressure from state medical
and hospital associations,' 4 the members of which are resistant
to UR, seven states have enacted laws governing private UR.'
In general, these state regulatory efforts generally parallel the
recommendations in the IOM report.'
The principal problem with most of the state laws is that
the states do not enforce implementation. Although those
states that have passed specific implementation regulations do
have application materials and fees, UR firms report they send

51. See IOM Report, supra note 44.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. All states have trade associations of physicians and hospitals. These
associations have varying amounts of political power and influence on state and local
government. In the author's opinion, based on her experience and work with more
than 100 UR offices around the country, physicians in the South are particularly
resistant to cooperating with UR.
55. N. Beskin, internal William M. Mercer, Inc. Practice Group Communique:
Utilization Review CertiicationLicensing & Regulation-State Laws, (September 14,
1990).
56. The following summary of state laws was prepared by the law firm of
Altheimer & Gray in Chicago for use by health benefits consultants. Maryland
enacted the earliest law (effective in December, 1988, and modified in July 1990)
governing private UR. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19.1301-.1313 (1990). Maryland
law requires certification by the Maryland Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene
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before conducting UR. Id. at § 19.1303. It also requires that case involving alcoholism,
drug abuse, or mental illness by reviewed by specialists. Id. at § 19.1305.1.
Maryland requires the following information on the application:
1. An outline of the UR plan, including a description of review standards and
procedures and provisions for appeals;
2. The types and qualifications of the personnel employed or under contract to
perform UR;
3. Procedures to ensure a UR representative is accessible 5 days a week during
normal business hours;
4. Policies and procedures to ensure the confidentiality of medical records;
5. Copies of material informing patients and providers of the UR requirements;
6. A list of the third party payors for which the organization performs UR Id. at
§ 19.1305.
Effective January 1, 1990, Arkansas has a virtually identical law, except that
specialist review is not required. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-901-914 (1989).
Effective in July 1989, Maine's law is similar but requires more detail on the types
of programs offered and the timing of notices to providers and patients differs. Maine
also provides that the Superintendent of Insurance may conduct periodic reviews to
ensure compliance and may conduct telephone audits to ensure access. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24 § 2342-45 (1989).
In Kentucky, effective January 1, 1991, certain firms must register with the
Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources before conducting UR. Kentucky
requirements are similar except that 1) toll-free telephones are required; 2) UR plans
must list circumstances where UR may be delegated to a hospital; 3) UR plans must.
specify how the firm will notify patients and providers when payment is denied; 4)
specialists must be available; and 5) UR plans must specify time requirements for
notice and appeals. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 211.461-.466 (1990).
Although similar to Arkansas law, the Mississippi statute, which became effective
July 1, 1990, contains a significant provision: written certification by a licensed
physician that the patient was in immediate need of hospital care should be forwarded
to the insurer within 72 hours of admission. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-83-21 (1990). This
creates a prima facie case of the medical necessity of admission. Id. This provision
essentially prevents any UR firm from making a binding decision on medical necessity
and could provide a significant barrier to effective UR in Mississippi. The statute also
provides that a patient's physician can require the evaluation and concurrence of a
relevant specialists or sub-specialist before an adverse UR decision is made. Id. at § 4883-31(b). Mississippi requires certification by the State Department of Health.
Effective January 31, 1990, South Carolina requires UR agents to be registered and
regulated by the South Carolina Chief Insurance Commissioner. S.C. CODE ANN. § 3870-20(A) Law Co-op. 1976 (Supp. 1990). The statute is similar to the Arkansas law but
requires notification to the insured of an adverse UR decision within 5 business days
and permits the Commissioner to conduct periodic reviews to ensure compliance and
to conduct telephone audits to ensure accessibility. Id. § 38-70-20(c)(1).
Virginia's statute is similar to Arkansas law. Sections 38.2-5300 through 38.2-5309
of the Code of Virginia, effective July 1, 1990.
Florida has proposed an extremely restrictive bill which is expected to be effective
in October 1991. Among the more restrictive provisions are the requirements that
there be procedures and policies to ensure accessibility of a UR representative 40 hours
a week and that the UR firm provide proof of a sufficient amount of professional
liability insurance. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0172(5)(d) (West 1991). Other provisions
include a requirement that any determination that care is medically inappropriate
includes the written evaluation findings of the reviewing physician, id. §
395.0172(5)(b)2, and requires the UR firm to disclose any incentive compensation
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in the application and fee and hear nothing more.57 Given the
lack of active state efforts to implement their UR laws, it is
likely that the voluntary accreditation efforts will be more
effective at addressing and resolving some of the common
problems with UR implementation.
V.

PROBLEMS IMPLEMENTING UTILIZATION REVIEW

The voluntary guidelines and most state laws are intended
to address variations in UR program implementation which
create problems for employers, patients, physicians, and hospitals. Some of these problems are unique to the areas in which
specific firms are located. However, there are problems and
concerns which are common to many, if not most, UR firms.
These problems include inaccessibility, variations in medical
criteria, too few physician reviewers, unqualified staff and
untimely reviews. 8 Each of these problems impinges on the
effectiveness of UR and prevents UR from gaining widespread
cooperation by providers and acceptance by employers.
arrangement based on the firm's record of reduction or denial of services. Id.
§ 395.0172(f).
For the most part, the laws represent reasonable efforts to create some
consistency in UR program implementation. The individual variations (e.g.,
specifications of time frames) are the result of specific local problems encountered
with specific programs.
57. Based on conversations with more than 100 UR firms, it is the opinion of the
author that there is a lack of strong implementation of state laws. Some UR firms are
unaware of the states which have enacted such laws and therefore do not comply with
the state's specific laws. Other firms have tried to apply for certification but have not
received responses or have been told the certification process has not yet been
implemented. Furthermore, it is not clear how any of the states actually evaluate or
use what they receive.
58. The problems and issues discussed herein are based on the authoi's direct
experience in performing on site program assessments at more than 100 UR offices
across the country between 1985 and the current date. These evaluations have been
conducted on behalf of employers, insurance companies, governments, and the UR
firms themselves by the Medical Audit Services unit of William M. Mercer, Inc., an
international employee benefits consulting firm. A team comprised of an individual
experienced in the operations of UR systems and a physician experienced in the
clinical application of efficient standards of care visit the UR office to evaluate the
program operations. These on-site assessments are usually preceded by an off-site
analysis of the UR programs operational materials. The team focuses on key aspects of
the program including the clinical appropriateness of criteria and their application,
qualifications and numbers of staff (including physicians), timeliness of review,
telephone access, system efficiency, and responsiveness to patients and providers.
These assessments are conducted under a variety of confidentiality arrangements and,
therefore, specific organizations cannot be referenced.
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Clients Lack Access to Utilization Review Firms5 9

Lack of access is one of the major problems with UR program implementation. This problem results from three types
of situations: inadequate hours, inadequate numbers of staff
members, and inadequate telephone service. Often, all three
are related.
Inadequate hours are caused when national UR firms staff
their offices only during business hours in their own local time
zone. In this situation, a firm located on the East coast may
work from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. Eastern time, leaving West Coast
providers and patients with access between 4 a.m. and 2 p.m.
Pacific time. This means that out-of-area providers have fewer
hours to make contact with the UR firm during the business
day. These providers are probably less likely to make contact.
Since physicians who are willing to return calls to UR
firms generally do so at the end of their business day, UR
firms which do not offer extended hours are inaccessible to
these callers. Even though most firms have answering
machines for after hours calls, many still request call-backs
during normal business hours, and they do not provide a
message service.
Even in those situations where a client attempts to call
back within the UR firms's hours, the client may be unable to
get through.' In some cases, a review of telephone monitoring
reports has validated many complaints by clients. These
reports show abandoned call rates in excess of 10 percent with
an average abandonment time of over one minute. Such a
showing indicates that people were at least calling and waiting
on hold and not just hanging up immediately.
A client who does manage to call within the firm's business hours and who does get his or her call answered may still
be unable to speak with a reviewer. The client may be put on
hold for long periods of time or told to call back because of the
unavailability of staff. Since UR is labor intensive and nurses
are expensive and in short supply, some firms are thinly
staffed. Nurse staffing ratios vary dramatically, partially as
59. A UR firm has many "clients" who may lack access to it, including employees,
patients, physicians, and hospitals in addition to the specific employer or insurer with
whom the UR firm has a contract.
60. Since some employers impose penalties (e.g. a cash penalty such as $250 or a
reduction in benefits such as from 90 percent to 70 percent coverage) for failure to
notify, the ability to get through to register the case can be critical.
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the result of technological support available in the organization
and partly as the result of cost. Staffing ranges from one nurse
for every 8000 covered lives to one nurse for more than 50,000
covered lives. 6 When staffing is thin, nurses cannot respond
to all the calls received. This can result in "telephone tag"
which frustrates UR staff members as well as patients and
providers.6 2
Nurse staffing is particularly critical to the effective
review of emergency admissions because, frequently, admitting
office staff will have record of only the patient's diagnosis and
possibly a patient procedure that is being done, but the staff
Since many emergency
will have no clinical information.
admissions are for symptoms such as chest pain or abdominal
pain, there is not a great deal of clinical data immediately
available to the UR program. Because the attending physician
may not have seen the patient yet, and key lab results may not
be available, the physician will have little information. Consequently, UR firms frequently rely on hospital UR departments
for clinical data.
Although practices vary, many large hospitals and many
smaller hospitals have UR departments or staff people who
work with external UR firms to provide clinical information.
A few hospitals simply refuse to cooperate, referring the UR
caller to the physician or patient. Even though most hospitals
cooperate, they express concerns about the level of detail
required by some UR firms. Hospital UR staff are sometimes
frustrated by providing a lot of information and then not
receiving any assistance from the UR firm when they want to
check on review status.
Because emergency admissions are difficult to review'and
often require daily follow-up, many UR firms essentially do
not try to review them. A few firms simply approve up to
three days, no questions asked. Others try to review them ret61. See supra note 57.
62. "Telephone tag" can result in substantial confusion about what, if anything,

has been completed by the review firm. For example, a patient, thinking his or her
admission has been approved, may go to the hospital only to be told the review
decision has not been received. While there are no written industry standards for
staffing or telephone access, the most sophisticated telephone systems permit a UR
firm to monitor its service levels by evaluating average speed of answer, abandoned
call rates, average time to abandon, average hold time, and average talk time. Most
firms have target service levels and many used automated attendants to help guide
callers to the proper department. Common access targets include abandoned call rates

of less than 5% and average speed of answer within 30 seconds to one minute.
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rospectively, requesting data from physicians' offices and hospital medical records departments.
The smaller the UR staff, the less likely these cases will
be reviewed in a timely fashion, resulting in unreasonably late
requests for clinical information. If these cases are not
reviewed at all but just "automatically" approved, providers
begin to simply ignore the system, and UR effectiveness suffers. Despite hospital and physician complaints about requests
for information about current patients, most believe that influencing hospital use is a legitimate UR goal and they are more
likely to cooperate for current patients. Most are not likely to
cooperate with requests for clinical information about discharged patients. Providers view these requests as simply "job
justification" for incompetent review firms.
Until and unless review programs operate 24 hours per
day, seven days per week, medically unnecessary emergency
admissions will not be totally eliminated. Although very few
programs offer extended hours, more programs are offering
patient help-lines, one or two of which offer extended hours
for patients and providers. Thus, in most programs, the review
goal is not to deny or divert the admission but rather to assure
the length of stay is only as long as is needed to adequately
diagnose and resolve the problem.
B. Effective Medical Criteriaare Difficult to Implement
A major contributing factor to overuse of hospital services
is the variation in local and regional patterns of practice that is
It is
unrelated to the health status of the local population.'
clear that hospital use varies widely across the United States.
Although there are no complete national comparative statistics
on hospital use in the private sector, in its 1989 Annual Report,
Mutual of Omaha reported a national average of 461 days of
care per 1,000 people. By state, the same figure varied from a
low of 261 to a high of 695.' This wide variation in clinical
63. Blumberg, Regional Differences in Hospital Use Standardized by Reported
Mortality, 20 MED. CARE, 931 (Sept. 1982).
64. For example, based on clinical research during the early 1980s, patients
undergoing a simple cholecystectomy (removal of gallbladder) without complications
can be safely discharged on the third postoperative day, resulting in a total length of
stay of 2 days. Hall, supra note 36. Yet in 1988, for patients of ages 20 to 49, the
national average length of stay was 4.5 days. "Length of Stay by Diagnosis and
Operation, United States, 1988," HealthcareKnowledge Systems, Ann Arbor Michigan,
October, 1989.
In the western United States, the length of stay for a standard cholecystectomy is
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practices may create problems for UR firms as they attempt to
implement criteria that will eliminate unnecessary care.
The criteria a UR firm uses are important because the criteria in large part determine overall effectiveness 5 in curbing
unnecessary hospital use.66 Theoretically, the more comprehensive and rigorous the criteria, the more unnecessary6 7 care
will be eliminated and hence the lower the costs of care.
Problems may arise, however, when a UR firm uses criteria that differ from the predominate practice in an area. In
As a
such an instance, physicians may be uncooperative.6
result, employers and employees may experience confusion
approaching two days. In other parts of the country, the stay remains at four or more
days. Mutual. of Omaha Companies, Annual Report on Current Trends in Health Care
Costs and Utilization (1989).
65. See supra note 42.
66. Ware, Comparison of Health Outcomes at a Health Maintenance Organization
with those of Fee-For-ServiceCare, THE LANcET, May 3, 1986 at 1017.
According to Rand Corporation's Health Insurance Experiment, the HMO reduced
expenditures by about 25 percent, principally through a 40 percent reduction in
hospital care without a reduction in the quality of care provided. In this study, 1,673
individuals living in Seattle, Washington in 1976 were randomly assigned to an HMO
(The Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound or to one of eleven insurance plans in
the fee for service system (FFS)). These patients were studied over 3 to 5 years. This
study found that
"health outcomes in the two systems of care differed for high and low income
individuals who began the study with health problems. For the high income
initially sick group, the HMO produced significant improvements in
cholesterol levels and in general health ratings compared with free FFS care.
The low income initially sick group assigned to the HMO reported
significantly more bed-days per year due to poor health and more serious
symptoms than those assigned free FFS care, and a greater risk of dying by
comparison with pay FFS plans.
Manning, A Controlled Trial of the Fffect of a PrepaidGroup Practiceon Use of Services, 316 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1505 (1984).
67. The more rigorous the UR firm's criteria, the more clinical detail they require
for evaluation. Some firms address only the site of care (hospital or ambulatory)
during the preadmission review process and do not address the need for surgery.
Weak criteria permit a patient to be hospitalized for a procedure that could be safely
performed outside the hospital. For example, cataract surgery is routinely performed
on an ambulatory basis in all parts of the country. However, practice patterns vary
with tonsillectomy, hernia repair, myelogram and cardiac catheterization. Although
these procedures are performed safely and routinely in an ambulatory setting in many
areas, providers in other areas simply will not perform certain procedures on an
ambulatory basis.
For procedures always requiring an inpatient stay (e.g. coronary artery bypass
grafts), most UR firms will authorize a specific number of hospital days, usually until
the next review date.
68. The criteria used by a UR firm create most of the major controversies and fuel
much of the provider resistance to UR. The more rigorous the UR criteria, the fewer
the days assigned on initial review. To influence hospital use, the most effective UR
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because they are caught between their physicians' advice and
the UR firms' recommendations.
In response to the dilemma of attempting to implement
effective criteria in the face of varying physician practices, UR
firms adopt very different criteria. Some firms deliberately
sacrifice maximum effectiveness for local provider acceptance.
These firms use criteria which accommodate the widest possible variation of practice. Other firms adopt rigorous criteria
and apply them rigidly, engendering numerous complaints
from providers, patients, and employers. The firms most successful in balancing a high level of effectiveness with high provider acceptance use rigorous criteria applied in a consultative
way. That is, they work to educate the patients and providers,
"bending" the criteria when locally appropriate.6 9 This way,
requires setting an initial stay (or review date) at the patient's earliest possible
discharge date.
Many UR firms use national averages to set initial stays. While more acceptable
to providers, such programs primarily focus on long stay cases rather than on
attempting to influence the overall average pattern of use. Thus, "savings" in these
programs may be limited.
Physicians may or may not discuss expected lengths of stay or ambulatory surgery
options with patients, and patients may not ask the questions. Many UR firms do not
talk to patients at all and instead rely on physicians to communicate UR
recommendations. In fact, some firms consider patient calls "junk" calls.
69. Some UR firms have developed and adopted proprietary medical criteria
which are derived from the clinical literature and are modeled on effective HMO
standards of hospital use. HMO standards generally are that any services that can be
provided outside the hospital setting will be provided in that alternate setting.
Organizations applying the HMO approach to an indemnity fee-for-service plan may
apply criteria rigidly, issuing denials of coverage when criteria are not met. Other
firms will screen based on HMO-type criteria but will accommodate and verify the
lack of local services such as rehabilitation or nursing home care.
Many firms use national criteria sets such as the InterQual Intensity of Service,
Severity of Illness, Discharge Screens Appropriateness (ISD-A) criteria or the
Appropriateness Evaluation Protocol (AEP). See discussion supra note 43. In 1978,
using the AMA criteria, PSRO and Medicare data, and updated clinical literature,
InterQual published its "Intensification Criteria for Concurrent Review." These
criteria were intended to be more specifically tailored for easy review of hospitalized
patients. InterQual regularly updates its criteria based on the clinical literature and
technological and organizational changes in the health care system.
In 1984, Restuccia & Gertmann, supra note 3, developed the Appropriateness
Evaluation Protocol (AEP) which provided some generic (i.e., not as diagnosis specific
as AMA criteria or as body-system specific as InterQual) to identify inappropriate
hospital days.
More recently, some organizations have developed proprietary screening criteria
which include the concept of efficiency of use-i.e., not only are the services required
by the patient's condition, but are also provided in the most efficient, least costly
setting consistent with high quality of patient care. These criteria essentially reflect
very broad patterns of practice and accommodate a wide variety of practice styles.
UR firms using HMO-type criteria seek to change "average" practice patterns.

548

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 14:527

the UR firms are able to encourage providers to give less
unnecessary care.
Eliminating unnecessary care is possible for many providers. 7' For example, in the West, the length of stay (reflecting
local practice) for an uncomplicated normal vaginal delivery is
approaching one day post-delivery. In the East and South,
three day post-delivery stays are not uncommon and the average length of stay over two days.7 Another example of local
practice variation is preoperative hospital admission. For most
planned surgeries, patients can be safely prepared on an outpatient basis and admitted the day of surgery. Even so, there are
still areas of the country where pre-operative nights are the
normal pattern of practice.
In light of these examples, it appears as though clinical criteria would be relatively -straight forward and easy to
enforce. 72 However, there are a number of problems. One
principal problem is physician resistance to the application of
criteria that the individual physician may perceive as unacceptable. The criteria may be unacceptable to a physician because
the criteria are different from the way he or she has always
practiced. Also, the physician may disagree with the clinical
literature on which the criteria are based.
Another problem is that patients and physicians alike may
perceive more care as better care. In other words, the more
time in the hospital, the better the care. In reality, however,
more is not always better when it comes to hospitals. Hospitals
are not necessarily conducive to speedy recoveries. They are
noisy, the food is often poor, and there are risks of acquiring a
hospital-based infection or receiving the wrong medication.
Despite the evidence that hospitals are not always best for
the quickest recoveries, many physicians continue to recomFirms using nationally-accepted criteria sets seek to identify significant outliers and do
not generally seek to change "average" practice patterns.
70. All of the states with UR regulations are in the East and South. These areas
have had some of the highest levels of hospital use in the country. See Healthcare
Knowledge Systems, supra note 64.
71. Such variations are fairly consistent across the full range of diagnoses and
procedures. See supra note 66.
72. Clinical criteria are theoretically based on the biology of patients (e.g. a
woman delivering a baby on the East coast is not biologically different from a women
on the West coast), clinical studies or practice consensus. However, there are
legitimate clinical disagreements. One study of six medical and surgical procedures,
found an 11-29 percent disagreement among physicians on the indications for the
particular procedures. Park, Physician Ratings of Appropriate Indications for Six
Medical and Surgical Procedures, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 766, 769 (1986).
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mend hospital stays which are too long in comparison to
lengths of stay common elsewhere. Since many patients continue to regard physician advice as absolute, patients may not
willingly accept a shorter hospitalization.73 Dealing with these
perceptions is perhaps UR's biggest challenge. Those firms
which are most successful in attaining maximum impact with
minimum provider or patient dissatisfaction engage in
extended discussions with both physicians and patients, seeking to identify acceptable compromises. This approach requires
good access and a high level of staffing.
The failure of a UR firm with rigorous criteria to actively
engage in discussions with physicians and patients leads these
same physicians and patients to perceive that benefits are
being taken away.7 4 In these programs, a patient may end up
in the middle of a disagreement between the UR firm and
attending physician. At other times, the patient may not be
aware of the problem until he or she is notified that the services have not been approved. Either way, these situations
result in negative UR experiences for the patient and the provider. To address these problems, employers often request
that the UR firm waive the criteria and approve the services.
Then, not only is there the cost of unnecessary care but there
is also the cost of "wasted" UR services.
Clearly, perceptions of patients, physicians and employers
on the necessity for hospital services are important. A major
function for UR firms could be to soften and change these perceptions. However, this is not seen as a high priority by many
firms.

75

73. Kolata, Wariness is Replacing the Trust Between Physician and Patient,The
New York Times, Feb. 20, 1990 at Al, col.l.
74. Some UR firms use rigorous criteria but do not engage in active discussions
with providers and patients to explain the rationale and benefits of the criteria.
Rigorous criteria mindlessly applied results in substantial hostility.

Ironically, those

firms with weaker criteria which simply collect information to support common
practices are viewed as unnecessary burdens on the health care system. Thus,
programs adopting common practice criteria may find lack of provider cooperation
because they essentially "don't do anything."

75. Based on the author's experience, many UR firms do not view themselves as
having "educational" responsibilities. They narrowly define their roles to applying a
set of clinical criteria to the medical information collected on a case. Some do not talk
to patients or physicians. The less effective programs approve everything and are
viewed by providers as ineffective. Other ineffective programs issue many denials
which are subsequently approved on appeal and these programs are viewed as
harassment.
The most effective programs use rigorous criteria as discussion points with
providers and patients and they issue few denials or straight approvals. Rather, they
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Some have suggested that the use of second opinions
would eliminate much unnecessary care by decreasing unnecessary surgeries. However, requiring a second opinion is not
necessarily a solution to curbing unnecessary surgery for several reasons. Primarily, the physician providing the second
opinion may practice in the same region as the primary physician, and, therefore, may act in accord with the same regional
practices. Furthermore, in rural areas, there may be only one
or two physicians in a particular specialty; providing second
opinions for each other can be a major source of revenue. At
the same time, UR becomes a joke and is viewed as a costly
administrative layer in the health care system.
Some UR firm staff have no clear concept about the core
intent of a second opinion program and may "sympathize" with
patients about the administrative hassle of the second opinion
requirement, indicating that the purpose of a second opinion is
merely to fill an insurance requirement. These firms reinforce
provider and patient views that UR is a "hassle" and a potential "take away."
Another problem UR firms face in discouraging unnecessary hospital care is the lack of local alternative services in
some areas. Many services that have typically been available
only in a hospital setting (e.g. home intravenous antibiotics,
physical therapy, traction, etc.) are now widely available on an
ambulatory basis. However, some areas lack high quality alternative services. In these situations, UR firms can do little to
eliminate the unnecessary hospitalization.
C. Insufficient Qualified PhysicianReviewers
Another concern facing UR firms is inadequate access to
physician reviewers. Attending physicians are often frustrated
by their inability to talk with a UR physician about the proposed treatment plan or a pending denial. The most successful
UR firms employ specific physicians who are available during
business hours to take calls from attending physicians. A combination of full-time skilled professional physician reviewers
supplemented by contracted specialists seems to be an optimal
physician staffing pattern. Ideally, an attending physician
should be able to talk "live" with a reviewing physician within
two hours of a request.
are able to negotiate treatment plan modifications. Firms that take the negotiations
stance tend to have longer hours and provide easier access to review staff.
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Attending physicians become frustrated and suspicious if
they can never reach a UR program physician. The worst
example of this is the few UR programs in which the physician
reviewers actively "hide" from attending physicians. They will
not engage in a telephone discussion with an attending physician concerning the particulars of a case or the firm's review
criteria. These physicians may refuse to give their names and
are essentially anonymous. Even if physician reviewers do not
hide, however, many firms do not have ready access to specialists if a physician wants a specialty review, and some firms use
retired physicians who are not current in their medical
knowledge.
The scope and depth of physician involvement in all
aspects of UR program operations is critical to a UR firm's
ability to balance effectiveness with provider acceptance. In
programs without ready physician review, very few cases are
disapproved. These programs tend to use relatively weak
clinical criteria and are viewed by providers as essentially an
administrative "hassle" layer.
Other programs, which tend to use more rigorous criteria,
do offer much better access to reviewing physicians who are
willing to engage in clinical discussions with attending physicians. These programs are also more likely to offer immediate
specialty backup. As a result, these programs also have very
low outright disapproval rates. However, review physicians
will be involved in as many as 40 percent or more of the cases
assessed. The principal goal of these programs is the negotiation of a mutually acceptable plan of treatment.
D.

Staff QualificationsAre A Significant Concern

The vast majority of UR firms use nurses to screen the
information obtained from the physician or patient against
clinical criteria.7 6 Nursing experience requirements vary
widely, with some programs requiring one or two years of
clinical experience and others requiring a minimum of five
years. Some firms provide regular continuing education,
others do not.
Although the employer and provider concerns may be
expressed as staff qualifications, actual qualifications may be
less important than the way staff present themselves on the
76. Some programs use non-licensed support staff to collect demographic and even

some basic clinical information.
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telephone. Providers may not be aware they are talking to
nurses because staff do not always identify themselves. In
some programs, nurses talk like insurance clerks, using insurance jargon and illogical terms. For example, one provider
describes a call, six months after discharge, in which the UR
firm caller requested the "plan of treatment and the diagnosis
to receive preauthorization approval."7 7
8
Unfortunately, such confusing calls are not uncommon.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the provider receiving the call thought the caller was a clerk, when
the caller was probably a nurse who had fallen into the common habit of merely requesting information rather than
attempting to assure the appropriateness of care. These calls
contribute to local perceptions of incompetence and insensitivity, and also create substantial internal confusion.
E.

Timeliness and Frequency of Review is Critical

To effectively influence use, a UR firm must review a case
as quickly as possible, either before or while the services are
being provided. Actual use will not change if review is routinely completed long after services have been rendered.7 9
Most firms establish target turnaround times for review
decisions that are commonly within 24 to 72 hours after the
firm becomes aware of a case. In a few programs, as many as
40 percent of the reviews are completed late, more than one
working day after receipt of a timely notification. When
review decisions are delayed, the patient and physician have
two basic choices. They can proceed without approval and deal
with any problems after the fact or they can wait for approval.
In most cases, however, they will proceed without approval.
Since this usually works and services are eventually approved,
77. Moore, How I Fight the PreauthorizationRacket, MED. ECONOMICS, December

10, 1990, at 54.
78. In fact, some firms develop definitions for terms like "total and partial
retrospective pre-determinations."
79. Retrospective review programs tend to focus on the accuracy of billing. These
programs focus on comparing the hospital bill with the services actually documented
in the medical record. They may also focus on charges relative to a particular fee
schedule or prevailing usual and customary charge for a specific service. In some
cases, these reviews identify medically unnecessary services. The problem with
retrospective denial of services (as opposed to fee modifications) is that someone,

whether it is the patient, the provider, or the public in the case of bad debts, will
ultimately pay for the denied services.
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providers quickly identify those firms who do not conduct
timely reviews and essentially ignore them.
Review delays associated with second opinion requirements can have substantial hidden costs. For example, requiring a second opinion only one or two days before the date of
the procedure disrupts physician and hospital surgical schedules and interferes with the patient's plans for time off from
work. Although in the vast majority of programs the second
opinion requirement is applied only to planned or elective procedures, there are rare instances in which a second opinion has
been required for non-elective procedures, thereby delaying an
obviously necessary surgery.
The best UR firms complete more than 90 percent of
reviews within 24 hours of notification. Both telephone and
written notification of recommendations are often provided. If
the review is not timely, the ultimate outcome will have no
effect on use but rather simply shifts the costs of the services
to the patient or provider.
In a typical telephone appeal process, a call between the
treating physician and reviewing physician will be scheduled at
a mutually convenient time. If no agreement is reached, a call
with another reviewer may be scheduled. Depending on the
case, the treating physician may request the second call to be
with a specialist or sub-specialist. In the vast majority of cases
involving a telephone appeal, the reviewer and treating physician reach some agreement and no formal disapproval is ever
issued.
Another complaint hospitals have on the review process is
that UR firms use different timetables for follow-up. More
frequent review intervals may put pressure on hospital UR
staff to perform more frequent reviews than they would nor-

mally schedule. In a few programs, the UR firm expects the
hospital or physician to call and request additional days at the
end of the authorized length of stay. Under this approach to
continued stay review, hospitals legitimately feel it is not their
job to track external review dates. In the absence of contract
arrangements with providers which require such notification,
it is difficult to require provider performance or apply penalties in this type of program.
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VI.

THE FUTURE OF UR FUTURE-PROSPECTS AND
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

A.

The Requirement of Increased Accountability

A significant future trend will be greater legal accountability for UR programs. This trend started with two important
cases8 0 which raised key issues of a UR firm's legal accountability to patients.
Both cases involved the legal responsibility a third-party
payor has for harm caused to a patient when a UR program is
used to allegedly affect the treating physician's medical judgment. In each case, the defendant third party payors in each
case failed to approve additional hospital days, and, as a result,
the patients were discharged earlier than the patients' physicians had originally requested, and in both cases, serious consequences resulted.
In the first case, Wickline v. State of California,"' the
plaintiff sued the State of California for negligently discontinuing her Medi-Cal 2 eligibility, causing her to be prematurely
discharged from the hospital, leading to the amputation of her
leg." The patient had been hospitalized for a graft insertion
into an artery, a procedure necessary to restore full. circulation
to her lower leg.84 Prior to her hospitalization, the plaintiff's
surgery and a ten day post-operative hospital stay were
approved, as required, by a Medi-Cal employee.8 5
Following surgery, the plaintiff developed complications,
inducing her physicians to request eight additional post-operative hospital days. The Medi-Cal physician reviewing the
request form rejected the eight-day extension, approving
instead only four additional days.'
80. Wickline v. State of California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986);
Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern Cal., 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1990).
81. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986). Wickline was the first case in
which a patient attempted to "tie a health care payor into the medical malpractice
causation chain." Id. at 1633, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
82. The plaintiff's medical benefits were provided by the State of California's

medical program. Medi-Cal is California's equivalent of Medicaid. Id. at 1635, 228 Cal.
Rptr. at 664.
83. Id. at 1633, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
84. Id. at 1634, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 663. The patient actually suffered from Leriche's
syndrome, a condition caused by obstruction of the terminal aorta. In her situation,
the occlusion was just above the point where the aorta divides into two iliac arteries,
one of which descends into each leg. Id.
85. Id. at 1636, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
86. Id. at 1637, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 665. The Medi-Cal reviewing physician testified
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Although the patient's treating physicians were aware
they could try to obtain a further extension, they instead complied with the limited extension and discharged the patient
after 14 post-operative days." Nine days later, the patient's
new vascular graft occluded, and her leg had to be
amputated."
The plaintiff sued, naming Medi-Cal as the sole defendant,
for negligent withholding of care. She claimed that had she
been granted the eight additional days as her physician had
requested, she would not have suffered the loss of her leg.8 9
Therefore, the plaintiff alleged that the State of California
should be liable for negligently interfering with her physician's
treatment plan.
The court found that third party payors could be legally
responsible for medically inappropriate decisions resulting
However, that
from defective cost containment measures.'
was not the situation here. In this case, Medi-Cal's judgment
met the standard of care for "medical necessity."'" Furthermore, had the treating physicians believed that the plaintiff
should have remained hospitalized for an additional four days,
it was their responsibility to keep her there; the discharge decision "is the responsibility of the patient's own treating doctor."92 However, instead of exhausting the administrative
remedies available to them, the plaintiff's physicians chose to
comply with Medi-Cal's decision without protest, and this left
93
them, not Medi-Cal, responsible.
A second example of a case involving the withholding
that there was nothing on the extension request form showing any patient problems
and he presumed the patient was progressing satisfactorily. Id. at 1638, 228 Cal. Rptr.
at 666.
87. Id. One of the plaintiff's treating physicians testified at trial that he felt MediCal had the power to tell him when a patient must be discharged from the hospital.
Id. at 1640, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 667. He also testified, however, that the plaintiff's
discharge was medically proper. Id. at 1641, 1645, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 667, 670.
88. Id. at 1641, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
89. Id. at 1642, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 668. The plaintiff's treating physician testified
that had the plaintiff been in the hospital for the additional four days, he would have
noticed the changes in the plaintiff's leg caused by a clot occluding the graft. In that
case, he could have taken the plaintiff to surgery and removed the clot, thereby saving
her leg. Id.
90. Id. at 1645, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
91. Id. Title 22 of the California Administrative Code § 5110 provided that the
standard of care should be in accord with the usual standard of medical practice in the
community.
92. Id. at 1645, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670, 671.
93. Id. at 1646, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
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medical care because of prospective review came in Wilson v.
9 a case in which
Blue Cross of Southern California,
the California Court of Appeals limited Wickline to its own facts.95
The Wilson court reversed the trial court's grant of the summary judgment motions of four defendants, including an
independent UR provider. 6 In reversing the trial court, the
appeals court found a triable issue of fact on whether the
defendants' conduct was a substantial factor in causing the
death of Mr. Wilson. 9
The Wilson case involved the termination of Mr. Wilson's
hospitalization insurance after he had received eleven days of a
planned three to four week course of in-patient treatment for
"major depression, drug dependency, and anorexia."9'
This
termination of insurance was based on the independent UR
provider's determination, under its concurrent utilization
review process, "that the patient did not meet the admission
criteria for his particular insurance policy and that his further
stay was not justified or approved."99 Although Mr. Wilson's
physician believed this UR determination incorrect, the physician nevertheless informed Mr. Wilson that he would be personally liable for the costs of his three to four week stay. 1'0
Unable to pay for the services without insurance, Mr. Wilson
left the hospital.' 0 ' Twenty days later, Mr. Wilson committed
suicide. 10 2
As in Wickline, the defendants argued that they were
insulated from potential liability by the physician's failure to
institute normal appeals procedures with the UR provider. 0 3
However, the appeals court rejected this argument.'9 4 The
court distinguished Wickline on the basis that the physicians
in that case failed to follow a statutorily mandated appeals procedure. 10 5 By contrast, in Wilson the procedure for questioning the UR provider's judgment was "informal" and, at any
94. 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, rev. denied, (Oct. 11, 1990).
95. Id. at 664, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
96. Id. at 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 877.

97. Id. at 672, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
98. Id. at 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
99. Id. at 669, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 882.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
Id.
Id. at 673, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
Id. at 674, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
Id.
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rate, was not mandated by statute."°
Therefore, the Wilson court limited the language in Wickline which stated that physicians bear sole civil liability for
their decisions to discharge patients based on UR determinations that further treatment is unnecessary. 1 ' The court held
the language in Wickline dicta because it was unnecessary to
the decision."0 8 Thus, under California law, independent UR
providers may be liable for negligently determining that care is
unnecessary if such determination is a substantial factor in
subsequent harm to the patient and if the patient's physician
was under no statutory obligation to pursue appeals
procedures.
Furthermore, the Wilson court rejected the defendants'
argument that other language in Wickline, which noted the
"profound importance" of UR "to the health care community
and to the general public," should lead the court to affirm the
summary judgment because such important public policy issues
require a departure from normal bases of tort liability."°
Refusing to extend the Wickline dicta involving the public
Medi-Cal program to private insurance and health care contracts, the appeals court found no expression of a public policy
favoring protection of private UR providers from tort liability
for negligent determinations of unnecessary care." 0
As a result of these decisions, under Wickline, public
third-party payors and their UR providers are protected from
tort liability if they follow procedures and such procedures are
"reasonable," even if physicians fail to follow statutorily mandated appeals procedures. On the other hand, under Wilson
private third-party payors and independent UR providers are
not protected from liability for negligently finding health care
unnecessary, even if physicians fail to follow non-statutory
appeals procedures under the same conditions.
The Wickline and Wilson decisions indicate that as the
competition in the market increases, so will UR firms' accountability for the appropriateness of their procedures. In addition
to increased accountability, however, UR firms will have to
support the validity of claimed savings.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 666, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
Id. at 671, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
Id. at 672-73, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 884, citing Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1633.
Id.
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The Need to Support the Validity of Claimed Savings

As described in prior sections, there are independent studies which show UR can influence utilization and thereby
reduce overall medical costs. However, many firms grossly
exaggerate the magnitude of savings. These exaggerated
claims have made employers suspicious of the value of UR."'
The suspicions could turn to outright hostility if a UR program claims huge savings for an employer and simultaneously
that same employer's insurance premium rates were raised
drastically. It is even worse if the employer's benefits management department receives complaints from employees and
providers about the program.
Employers have typically relied on the UR firms themselves to report savings. Unfortunately the methodologies
most widely used by UR firms are simplistic and seriously
flawed because they do not tie savings to any actual changes in
utilization or health care costs. One popular savings calculation method compares the number of days requested by the
provider with the number of days authorized. These numbers
may or may not be tied to actual use.
As an example, for a laminectomy (back surgery), the provider might "request" five to eight days. Most providers simply report either their longest length of stay or whatever their
normal length of stay is. If the UR firm uses national length
of stay criteria, it would probably authorize five days on initial
review. Some firms would enter the eight days into the system
as requested days and the five as authorized days. If the
patient stayed five days, three days in savings might be
claimed. If the patient stayed only four days, four days in savings might be claimed, even though the UR firm authorized
five days. If the patient stayed the eight days, and UR authorized additional days, no savings would be claimed. Days saved
are totaled and multiplied by some dollar value assigned to a
hospital day. The result is described as UR savings.
Another firm might take the same case, enter the five as
days requested and claim no savings if the patient only stayed
five days. Such reports become difficult to support in the face
of other data (such as claims data) which might show overall
increases in actual use. The obvious problem with such a
method is that providers, in the hope of reducing the number
111. 8 BENEFITS NEWS ANALYSIS, Number 3, March, 1986
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of future review interactions, might overstate what they really
expect will be needed. Over time, providers may request as
many as 30 percent to 50 percent more days than patients actually use. UR firms operating on the basis of community standard criteria might approve 10 percent to 20 percent fewer
days than requested and still be approving 10 percent to 20 percent more days than patients actually use.
State regulations, voluntary guidelines, and greater
employer scrutiny 112 seem to be sending a clear messages to
the UR industry that some changes are needed. The more
innovative firms are implementing programs which apply highcost case management techniques to broader categories of
cases. For these firms, each case is evaluated for potential
management, even if only a day or two are in question. Nurses
are assigned to individual groups of patients and they act as
resource persons to help employees access the health care system more effectively.
UR firms which attempt to do this generally have multiple
advantages. They often have staff who are clinically sophisticated and have a good understanding of and sensitivity to the
needs of providers. As a result, their staff generally have
fewer hostile encounters with providers. These programs generally have more rigorous clinical criteria, better access to physician reviewers, and more contacts with treating physicians
involving discussions of clinical issues. They also tend to have
reasonable overall access and provide timely notifications and
responsive formal and informal appeals procedures. In addition, these firms regularly evaluate themselves and the use by
their employee groups, and they identify program modifications and new services.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Employers and coalitions of employers continue to expand
their roles in health care cost management as they more
actively manage employee use of their health benefits." 3 The
increasing demand for health care benefits in the workplace
coupled with the spiraling costs of health care premiums leads
to the inevitable conclusion that, regardless of the overall cost
112. See Diblase, Employers Scrutinize UR Programs,BUS.

INS.,

February 15, 1988,

at 1.
113. L. BERGTHOLD, PURCHASING
HEALTH CARE POLITICS (1990).

POWER IN HEALTH, BUSINESS THE STATE AND
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management strategy UR will be involved in monitoring the
effective use of health care. In general, therefore, the challenge of attaining an optimal level of effective use will be to
refine effective UR processes by improving provider and
patient relationships.

